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Abstract—After decades of research, cascading blackouts re-
main one of the unresolved challenges in the bulk power systems.
A new perspective for measuring the susceptibility of the system
to cascading failures is clearly needed. The newly developed
concept of system stress metrics may be able to provide new
insight into this problem. The method employs power engineering
and graph theory to analyze the network structure and electrical
properties of the system, with metrics that measure stress as the
susceptibility to cascading failures. In this paper, we investigate
the effectiveness of transmission switching in reducing the risk
of cascading failures, measured in system stress metrics. A case
study, analyzing different metrics on IEEE 118-bus test system,
is presented. The results show that transmission switching can be
used as a preventive as well as corrective mechanism to reduce
the system’s susceptibility to cascading failures. Contrary to the
conventional operation wisdom that switching lines out of service
jeopardizes reliability, our results suggest the opposite; system
operators can use transmission switching, when the system is
under stress, as a tool to reduce the risk of cascading failures.
Index Terms—Cascading failures, corrective switching, line
outage distribution factors, network theory, power system secu-
rity, preventive operation, stress metrics, transmission switching.
I. INTRODUCTION
THERE is an extensive body of academic and industryliterature on analyzing cascading blackouts, seeking ways
to eliminate them or at least reduce their frequency and
size, and improve the speed of recovery [1]. Most of the
blackouts have been subject to investigations and postmortem
analyses [1]. The largest blackout in the North American
grid, the Northeast blackout of 2003, was studied for over
a year. The results of this extensive analysis was published
in an illuminating three-volume report [2]. This report also
provides useful insight into a number of earlier cascading
failure events [1]. The North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) was established by the US-Canadian
power industry after the 1965 blackout to improve reliability,
notably by producing criteria and collecting data. Preventing
cascading blackouts has always been central to the objectives
of these criteria [3]. In 1974, state estimation was introduced
in power systems, so that system operators have more accurate
inputs to real-time procedures for increasing reliability. In the
context of cascading failures, the purpose of state estimation
was more to make data availability reliable rather than im-
proving the data accuracy [4]. Prior to that, a state model was
developed in which necessary considerations for the design
Authors are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineer-
ing, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, 84112 USA e-mail: (see
https://ardakani.ece.utah.edu/).
of a total control system for reliability improvement of the
the generation and transmission systems were incorporated.
In this model, the control system was made of automatic
functions, human participation, and an information system [5].
Much labor has been invested in a host of efforts to solve
the blackout problem. Recently, network theory has been
applied to blackouts and other problems in power systems,
but blackouts continue; the problem has not been solved [1].
A. Cascading Failures
Cascading failures in large systems can be due to at least
one of the following reasons: [1]
1) Failure of protection system and control devices;
2) Failure of processes and procedures;
3) Overly stressed loading conditions;
Among these failure causes, the possibilities of forestalling
the first two (i.e., “control and protective devices” and “poli-
cies and procedures”) or even testing for these failures are
astronomical and individual events are improbable. We simply
lack models that would reflect the effects of these two on
the system. In other words, we cannot model protection
and control system failures, and failures in processes and
procedures into our bulk electric system model. However,
history shows that cascading also depends critically on how the
system is loaded, which can be described by the system stress
metrics [1], [6]. This trend can be clearly observed in 2011
Western Interconnection post blackout study, shown in Fig. 1.
The figure shows the system stress for four different loading
conditions, with three stress metrics. Arizona and Southern
California are most stressed during the peak in the summer, as
the system is heavily loaded. The system is usually not nearly
as stressed during spring and winter peaks. The Southwest
blackout of 2011 occurred on September 8 at around 3:38
PM PDT. This time is not usually regarded as a peak hour;
however, as shown in Fig. 1, stress metrics reveal that the
system was indeed atypically stressed prior to the blackout.
The blackout was initiated by a technician mistake, who
switched a 500 kV line between APS’s Hassayampa and North
Gila substations in Arizona [7]. This blackouts could have
been avoided if stress had been identified and reduced in the
vulnerable and critical parts of the system [8].
A set of new tools including metrics of stress or susceptibil-
ity to cascading failures has been developed and discussed in
[1], [6]. They have been built on two very different theoretic
bases to develop methods that planners and operators can use
to spot stressed operating states and regions, and to plan and
operate the system securely. The tool has been successfully
ar
X
iv
:1
81
0.
00
65
1v
1 
 [e
es
s.S
P]
  2
1 A
ug
 20
18
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, SUBMITTED FOR PUBLICATION, MAY 2018 2
137
132
119
103
3
2
1 1
5
5
3
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
2016 (High Summer) 2011 (Blackout Day) 2016 (High Spring) 2016 (High Winter)
D
eg
re
e 
(N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
B
rn
a
ch
es
)
V
u
ln
er
a
b
il
it
y
 R
a
n
k
 (
%
)
Vulnerability Rank Criticality Degree Vulnerability Degree
Fig. 1. Comparison of the stress on Western interconnection for the peak load during different seasons in 2016 and the blackout day in September 2011 [8].
implemented on Peru System, Eastern Interconnection, and
Western Interconnection to explore the susceptibility of the
system to cascading failures [9]. In every instance of cascading
blackouts, the stress metrics were able to show unusual system
stress before the event [9].
B. Transmission Switching
Transmission switching (TS) refers to changing the topology
of the transmission network by opening or closing transmis-
sion lines. The concept, which was first introduced in 1968
by the German mathematician Dietrich Braess, is counter-
intuitive but a well-known fact that removing edges from a
network with selfish routing can decrease the latency incurred
by traffic in an equilibrium flow. Since then, a large body of
academic literature has been dedicated to study this paradox in
infrastructure networks [10]. This concept was first proposed
in power system in the 1980s; in the following years, a number
of studies adopted transmission switching as a corrective
mechanism [11]. Later, the concept of optimal transmission
switching was proposed to minimize the operation cost [12].
Recently, this technique has been integrated within different
power system operation models, such as security-constrained
economic dispatch, security-constrained unit commitment, as
well as real-time contingency analysis. TS has been proven
to be able to significantly reduce the operational costs and
improve the system reliability [12]–[15].
Due to computational complexity, as well as other concerns
such as dynamic stability, industry adoption of TS has been
very limited. Some system operators use TS as a corrective
mechanism for improving voltage profiles and mitigating line
overloads [16], [17]. TS is also being employed during planned
outages, to make the transition smooth, and also as a post-
contingency corrective action [18]. California ISO (CAISO)
is reported to perform TS on a seasonal basis and to relieve
congestion in the system [14], [19]. PJM has posted a list
of potential switching solutions that may reduce or eliminate
violations for normal and post-contingency situations [20],
[21]. However, these switching actions are not guaranteed to
always provide benefit because they are identified offline.
The use of transmission switching has been extensively
studied for different purposes in power systems, but no study
yet explicitly looked into the impact of transmission switching
on reducing the susceptibility of the system to cascading
failures.
This paper, first, aims to quantify the system susceptibility
to cascading failures in terms of the system’s stress. The
paper, then, studies the impacts of transmission switching on
reducing the system stress, and thereby lowering the system’s
susceptibility to cascading failures. The contributions of this
paper can be summarized as follows:
1) Further development of statistical metrics to measure
system stress by introducing two new metrics;
2) Examination of the impacts of preventive transmission
switching on reducing stress during unusually stressed
or poorly forecasted loading conditions;
3) Investigation of the benefits of corrective transmission
switching in reducing the system stress, after N-1 con-
tingencies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we introduce stress metrics to measure the susceptibility of the
system to cascading failures. Section III presents preventive
and corrective transmission switching. Section IV demon-
strates the effectiveness of the method via simulation studies
on IEEE 118-bus test system. Finally, Section V concludes
this paper.
II. MEASURE OF STRESS
To measure the stress on the system, elements from net-
work theory and traditional power system analysis have been
combined. Consequently, indices are developed, which can
describe how a failure would propagate through a system [1],
[6].
To calculate the stress metrics, flow violations on all the
lines after every potential contingency are needed. Such infor-
mation is readily available from the contingency analysis tool,
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which is a part of energy management systems [18], [22]. Even
without access to such information, post-contingency flows
can be approximately calculated via line outage distribution
factor (LODF), which colloquially are also referred to as
DFAX [1], [6]. These sensitivities can be calculated using
conventional power flow software with DC approximation, or
using the current-based generalized injection shift factors [23].
An LODFij of 0.5 indicates that 50% of the pre-outage
flow on line j would be added to the flow on line i, should
line j go out of service. Post-outage flow on line i after the
outage of line j is calculated in (1), where f0 indicates the
pre-outage flow.
fi ∼= f0i + LODFij × f0j (1)
This relationship is approximate, because the power system
is only approximately linear. However, the accuracy of (1) is
acceptable and power system planners and operators exten-
sively use LODFs in contingency analysis [1]. The experience
shows that for real power analysis, which is believed to
be the key issue, the nonlinearity is rarely troublesome [1],
[24]. It can be argued that nonlinear and dynamic issues,
as well as voltage problems, which are not reflected in the
linearized LODF, are part of cascading failures. We, of course,
agree that such effects occur, for example in the two famous
blackouts we described above. However, cascading failures
always begin with the linearizable real-power stresses that our
model captures.
The LODF matrix is not symmetrical. However, for a large
network, most of its values are rather small. Small values
beyond a threshold can be ignored to generate a sparse matrix.
The sparsity can, then, be exploited for enhancement of the
computation. In a passive linear network, the value of each
LODF is between -1.0 and + 1.0. Large positive or negative
values of LODF make cascading failure more likely. Tighter
coupling is more likely to overload line i and force it out of
the service if line j experiences and outage, all else being
equal. With an LODF of zero, the outage of line j by itself
will not cause an overload or outage of line i [1], [6].
Network theory suggests analyzing a network with metrics.
The metrics we describe below are variants of metrics used
commonly in network analysis. The stress metrics proposed
in [1], [6] reflect the pre-contingency and post-contingency
flows. This pre-contingency loading is determined by the
demand and the generation dispatch. These values are hy-
pothetical in planning models; however, in operation, the
pre-contingency loading is obtained from real-time metering,
which is processed by the state estimator [1], [6].
The definition of some of the metrics developed previously,
and those proposed in this paper to measure the stress or
susceptibility of the bulk electric power systems to cascading
blackouts are given below.
A. Vulnerability
Vulnerability deals with the post-outage flow on a moni-
tored line or transformer after the outage of another line or
transformer in the system. This is a reasonable measure of
stress, because cascading failures always begin with an outage,
overloading one or more other line or transformer. Conse-
quently, the protection relays will isolate the newly overloaded
lines, which will further weaken the system. Two metrics were
proposed in [1], [6] to quantify the vulnerability: the rank and
the degree of vulnerability. In addition, we introduce a new
metric for indexing the entire system’s vulnerability.
1) Rank of Vulnerability (V ranki ): The rank of vulnerability
is the maximum absolute value of flow on a line or transformer
in per unit of its rating after the outage of another line or
transformer. The rank of vulnerability matrix is a 1 × m1
matrix, where m1 is the number of monitored lines and
transformers. The ith rank of vulnerability is the maximum
post-outage flow on line or transformer i after the outage of
all m2 lines and transformers, taken out one at a time, where
m2 is the number of lines and transformers, whose outage
is monitored. Note that, the ith rank of vulnerability may be
greater than, less than, or equal to the pre-contingency flow
on the line or transformer [1], [6]. This metric is expressed
as a percentage of the post-contingency flow compared to the
line/transformer rating.
V ranki = max(
|fi|
fratedi
) (2)
2) Degree of Vulnerability (V degreei ): The degree of vul-
nerability is the number of single outages for which a moni-
tored line or transformer will be loaded over some threshold
value. The line’s rating is used to compute the degree of
vulnerability in this paper. The degree of vulnerability matrix
is a 1 × m1 matrix, where m1 is the number of monitored
lines and transformers. The ith element of this matrix is the
number of lines and transformers, among all the m2 lines and
transformers, whose outage leads to a power flow beyond the
specified threshold for the ith line or transformer. This metric
is calculated and shown in (3).
V degreei = count if(
|fi|
fratedi
> Thresholdi) (3)
3) System Vulnerability Degree (VSystem): The system
vulnerability degree, proposed in this paper, is the number of
non-radial monitored branches that will have a vulnerability
rank beyond some threshold value. The lines’ ratings were
used, here, to compute the number of vulnerability in this
study. The system vulnerability degree is a scalar, which is
measured as an index for the entire system, rather than a
specific line or transformer.
B. Criticality
Criticality measures how the outage of a line or transformer
affects other lines and transformers in the system. Rank and
degree of criticality are used to define criticality [1], [6], [8].
In addition, this paper introduces a new metric for measuring
the entire system’s criticality level.
1) Rank of Criticality (Cranki ): The rank of criticality of
a line or transformer i is the maximum absolute value of
flow through all other lines and transformers, per unit of their
capacity, after the outage of line or transformer i. The rank of
criticality matrix is a 1×m2 matrix, where m2 is the number
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of lines and transformers whose outage is monitored. The ith
rank of criticality is the maximum absolute value of all the
post-outage flows divided by the ratings of the m1 monitored
lines and transformers, after the outage of line or transformer
i [8]. This metric is expressed as a percentage of the rating of
the monitored lines or transformers, as shown in (4).
Cranki = max
k
(
|fk|
fratedk
) (4)
2) Degree of Criticality (Cdegreei ): The degree of criticality
of a line or transformer i is the number of monitored lines and
transformers that will be loaded above some threshold after the
outage of line or transformer i. The nominal rating of the lines
was used, here, for calculating the degree of criticality, similar
to the degree of vulnerability. However, any desirable threshold
can be picked by the operator, and the method does not limit
this choice. The degree of criticality matrix is also a 1×m2
matrix, where m2 is the number of lines and transformers
whose outage is monitored. The ith degree of criticality is the
number of lines and transformers among all the m1 monitored
lines and transformers whose flows will exceed the threshold
after the outage of the ith line or transformer. This metric can
be calculated as shown in (5).
Cdegreei = count if(
|fk|
fratedk
> Thresholdk) (5)
3) System Criticality Degree (CSystem): The system crit-
icality degree is the number of non-radial contingencies that
will result in a criticality rank beyond some threshold value.
Nominal line ratings were used to compute the number of
criticality in this study. Similar to the system vulnerability
degree, system criticality degree is also a scalar, which is
measured for the entire system.
III. TRANSMISSION SWITCHING
The electric transmission network is built redundant, in
order to ensure mandatory reliability standards, which require
protection against worst case scenarios. Due to the existence
of loop flows in this redundant meshed network, transmission
switching may lead to improved economic efficiency and
reliability [14]. This phenomenon is widely acknowledged;
however, finding appropriate switching candidates within the
available computational time for power system operation re-
mains to be a challenge.
Although transmission switching has many applications, it
can be solely performed to enhance the system reliability [18],
[21], [22], [25]. Reliability-motivated switching is perhaps
the first application of transmission switching that is used
by the industry [20]. References [18], [21], [22] employ
transmission switching to reduce the post-contingency network
violations. The method proposed in this paper also aims to
enhance reliability, but rather than post-contingency violation
reduction, we focus on reducing the system stress, which is
measured via the metrics, introduced in Section II.
As mentioned before, transmission switching is considered
to be a computationally challenging problem. A recent method,
which achieved tractability for reliability-motivated switching,
handled this challenge by only allowing a very limited set of
switching candidates [18], [21], [22]. The switchable elements
were picked either from a small vicinity of the contingency
or the violation. Extensive analysis showed that this small
subset includes almost all of the quality solutions [18], [21],
[22]. In this paper, we use a similar approach by only relying
on a small subset of switchable lines; however, rather than
searching within the vicinity of contingency or violation,
we employ the LODF matrix to choose the most effective
switching candidates. The potential candidates can be selected
by looking at the column of the overloaded line corresponding
to a contingency. A high negative LODF value is one of the
indications of the potential line for switching. Thus, LODF
matrix will provide us with a smart and fast method to select
the switching candidates.
Switching is generally classified into two categories, de-
pending on its timeline: preventive and corrective transmission
switching. We consider both of these categories in the next two
subsections, in the context of system stress reduction.
A. Preventive Transmission Switching
A preventive action in power system operation is taken to
avoid the adverse consequences of a potential disturbance. The
disturbance may never happen, but the preventive action will
protect the system against it, should it actually occur. In this
paper, we use preventive transmission switching to reduce the
system’s susceptibility to cascading failures. History shows
that cascading failures depend critically on how the system is
loaded, which can be described by the system stress metrics.
Post-blackout investigations show that in most cases the sys-
tem was atypically stressed before the blackout [1]. Had the
stress of the system been taken care of, the blackout could
have been prevented. This can be seen in [8], where the stress
on San Diego area was analyzed over different seasons of
the year and found that on September 8, 2011, and before
the blackout that happened later on the same day, the system
was atypically stressed. The blackout could have been avoided
through appropriate preventive actions that reduce the system
stress.
In this paper, we propose that preventive transmission
switching should be looked at, whenever the system is under
atypical stress, beyond a predefined level, in order to reduce
the stress on the system. We hypothesize that transmission
switching may be able to offer a cheap and fast solution, re-
lieve the system stress, and avoid potential cascading failures.
The line can be switched back, once the system stress has
been reduced due to change in the loading, if the line provides
economic benefits. There are other alternatives that can be im-
plemented as preventive actions, such as generation redispatch.
However, transmission switching can be implemented much
faster and is often the cheapest option, as it only involves the
operation of a circuit breaker. Moreover, it is often the case that
during the stressed operating conditions, generation redispatch
is depleted and not available anymore to the operator. Fig. 2
shows the proposed algorithm for transmission switching in
response to atypical stress on the system. An example of an
atypically stressed system was shown in Fig. 1, which led to
the Southwest blackout of 2011.
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Fig. 2. The algorithm, proposed in this paper, to reduce the system stress
using transmission switching.
B. Corrective Transmission Switching (CTS)
As transmission switching can be implemented instan-
taneously, unlike generation redispatch, which is relatively
slow, more studies have focused on corrective transmission
switching than preventive transmission switching. Corrective
transmission switching solutions are identified beforehand,
within the contingency analysis tool, and are ready for im-
plementation [18], [22]. Only after the contingency occurs,
does the operator need to implement the solution.
Our interest in this paper is to study how corrective
transmission switching can contribute to reducing a post-
contingency stress rather than the post-contingency violations.
The two are related, but are not the same. This paper examines
two hypotheses regarding corrective transmission switching.
First, we analyze the post contingency system stress that is
imposed on the system by the possibility of an N-1-1 event,
for the system that is already in the N-1 state. The second point
of interest for us is to monitor the ongoing level of stress in
the system, which is measured in terms of the lines that have
already exceeded their contingency limits. These overflows
should be addressed within a short period of time, defined
by the emergency limit’s maximum duration; otherwise, the
overloaded lines may trip and initiate a cascading failure. Thus,
transmission switching can either be considered corrective,
with respect to the current post N-1 state, or preventive, with
respect to the possibility of an N-1-1 event.
IV. CASE STUDIES
The case studies are conducted on IEEE 118-bus test
system. To generate a variety of stress levels, we use different
loading conditions at 97%, 105%, 106%, and 110% of the
system’s peak load. The nodal loads are uniformly adjusted
for all the cases, except for the 106% loaded case, where
the demand is increased only on select buses (16% in West
End (40) and 105% in S. Tiffin (41)). We, then, run an AC
TABLE I
THE CRITICALITY AND VULNERABILITY STRESS METRICS FOR THE IEEE
118 BUS TEST CASE AT 97% OF PEAK LOADING.
 
Rank (% ) Degree Rank (% ) Degree
1 L_26-30 222.94 5 34.2 0
2 L_8-9 155.73 2 32.47 0
3 L_25-27 128.69 1 103.38 2
4 T_30-17 127.94 1 88.13 0
5 T_8-5 116.33 1 60.14 0
6 L_65-68 107.04 1 18.56 0
7 L_5-11 102.22 1 67.68 0
8 L_23-25 100.46 1 114.5 1
9 L_15-17 80.9 0 116.33 1
10 L_32-113 77.38 0 222.94 4
11 L_23-24 77.37 0 155.78 4
12 L_4-5 67.68 0 102.22 1
N
o
. Line or 
Transformer
Criticality Vulnerability
optimal power flow for each loading, to obtain AC feasible
base case solutions for the analysis. These solutions are fed
to PowerWorld for to assist with calculation of stress metrics
and examination of transmission switching impacts.
We assume that all lines have their contingency limits at
120% of the normal limits, which can be used for a limited
duration of 4 hours. We further assume the emergency limits
to be at 135% of the normal line limits, which can be used up
to 15 minutes [26]. We acknowledge that the contingency and
emergency limits are not necessarily always scaled uniformly
to the normal limits; however, we make this assumption
to simplify the analysis presented in this paper. We further
acknowledge that such limits may change depending on the
weather or loading conditions; again, we have neglected such
details to simplify the analysis.
Tables I-IV present the stress analysis with different loading
conditions as described earlier. The purpose of these stress
tables is to demonstrate how loading with different patterns can
affect the system stress metrics. Generally, the stress increases
with the loading; however, the 106% loaded case, with non-
uniform increase in the nodal loads, is atypically stressed,
even beyond the 110% loaded case. This demonstrates that the
distribution of the load has a significant impact on the system
stress. We pick this atypically stressed case to demonstrate the
benefits of preventive transmission switching.
A. Preventive Transmission Switching
Figure 3 shows the various stress metrics, comparing the
stress on IEEE 118-bus case system, in terms of maximum
criticality rank, maximum degree, and system degree under
different loading conditions. As can be seen, the stress for the
case with 106% loading is atypically high. Table V shows the
stress on the same case after a preventive switching action
is implemented, where 17 Sorenson - 113 Deer Crk line is
opened, but the generation dispatch is not changed. A full
stress analysis is performed for pre- and post- transmission
switching and the stress comparison for this case is shown in
Fig. 4. The plot, comparing the number of lines, loaded above
both emergency and contingency limits, under different load-
ing patterns including after preventive transmission switching
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TABLE II
THE CRITICALITY AND VULNERABILITY STRESS METRICS FOR THE IEEE
118 BUS TEST CASE AT 105% OF PEAK LOADING.
 
Rank (% ) Degree Rank (% ) Degree
1 L_26-30 231.31 5 34.18 0
2 L_8-9 190.11 3 32.46 0
3 L_25-27 136.47 1 105.77 2
4 T_30-17 134.95 1 91.44 0
5 T_8-5 119.76 1 62.2 0
6 L_5-11 107.52 1 71.25 0
7 L_38-65 102.95 1 41.61 0
8 L_5-6 101.76 1 52.17 0
9 L_23-25 100.34 1 112.58 1
10 L_15-17 85.07 0 119.76 1
11 L_32-113 81.51 0 231.31 4
12 L_23-24 77.87 0 190.16 4
13 L_4-5 73.32 0 107.52 2
N
o
. Line or 
Transformer
Criticality Vulnerability
TABLE III
THE CRITICALITY AND VULNERABILITY STRESS METRICS FOR THE IEEE
118 BUS TEST CASE AT 106% OF PEAK LOADING.
 
Rank (% ) Degree Rank (% ) Degree
1 L_26-30 239.06 4 34.2 0
2 L_8-9 206.49 5 32.46 0
3 T_30-17 139.72 2 91.57 0
4 L_25-27 139.33 1 106.71 1
5 L_38-65 134.44 1 44.16 0
6 L_37-40 129.91 1 42.15 0
7 T_8-5 121.2 2 62.31 0
8 L_5-11 107.68 1 71.39 0
9 L_5-6 101.89 1 52.25 0
10 L_23-25 99.64 0 111.88 1
11 L_69-70 92.54 0 101.45 2
12 L_23-24 85.69 0 206.54 3
13 L_15-17 85.27 0 121.2 1
14 L_23-32 84.52 0 139.33 5
15 L_32-113 81.64 0 239.06 5
16 L_4-5 75.87 0 107.68 2
17 L_37-39 61 0 129.91 2
N
o
. Line or 
Transformer
Criticality Vulnerability
TABLE IV
THE CRITICALITY AND VULNERABILITY STRESS METRICS FOR THE IEEE
118 BUS TEST CASE AT 110% OF PEAK LOADING.
 
Rank (% ) Degree Rank (% ) Degree
1 L_26-30 234.28 5 34.19 0
2 L_8-9 192.43 3 32.46 0
3 L_25-27 135.69 1 105.61 1
4 T_30-17 134.38 1 90.2 0
5 T_8-5 117.6 3 61.62 0
6 L_5-11 109.59 1 72.41 0
7 L_5-6 102.74 1 50.75 0
8 L_23-25 99.66 0 112.71 1
9 L_15-17 86.73 0 117.6 1
10 L_32-113 83.29 0 234.28 5
11 L_23-24 77.17 0 192.48 3
12 L_4-5 73.11 0 109.59 2
13 L_12-14 72.58 0 100.25 1
N
o
. Line or 
Transformer
Criticality Vulnerability
TABLE V
THE CRITICALITY AND VULNERABILITY STRESS METRICS FOR THE 106%
LOADED IEEE 118 TEST CASE AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A SINGLE
PREVENTIVE SWITCHING ACTION (17 SORENSON - 113 DEER CRK).
 
Rank (% ) Degree Rank (% ) Degree
1 L_8-9 199.73 2 32.46 0
2 L_25-27 146.92 1 103.27 2
3 L_38-65 129.86 1 26.86 0
4 L_37-40 129.64 1 44.38 0
5 L_26-30 120.01 3 34.18 0
6 T_8-5 119.92 1 63.37 0
7 L_5-11 107.84 1 71.52 0
8 L_5-6 102.03 1 52.33 0
9 L_23-25 99.09 1 114.63 1
10 T_38-37 98.17 0 129.64 2
11 L_23-32 87.34 0 146.92 1
12 L_23-24 85.71 0 199.78 4
13 L_15-17 85.31 0 119.92 1
14 L_68-81 84.79 0 100.23 2
15 L_4-5 72.37 0 107.84 3
N
o
. Line or 
Transformer
Criticality Vulnerability
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TABLE VI
VARIOUS STRESS MEASUREMENTS FOR THE SYSTEM UNDER DIFFERENT LOADING CONDITIONS, INCLUDING THE 106% LOADED CASE AFTER
IMPLEMENTATION OF ONE PREVENTIVE TRANSMISSION SWITCHING ACTION.
Loading *Limit **Limit
as a % of V rank V degree VN Crank Cdegree CN (Emergency) (Contingency)
peak demand Violation Violation
97% 222.94% 5 8 222.94% 4 6 2 4
105% 231.31% 5 8 231.31% 4 6 3 4
+106% 239.06% 5 9 239.06% 5 9 4 7
++106% (PTS) 199.73% 3 8 199.73% 4 7 2 4
110% 234.28% 5 7 234.28% 5 7 3 4
* This column represents the number of lines that violate at least one of the lines’ Emergency Limit
* This column represents the number of lines that violate at least one of the lines’ Contingency Limit
+ 106% load is increased only at select buses.
++ The stress of +106% loading is measured post preventive transmission switching of 17 Sorenson - 113 Deer Crk line
is shown in Fig. 5. The results of different stress metrics
parameters is tabulated in Table VI. The results clearly show
that a single transmission switching action can substantially
reduce the system stress, and avoid a potential cascading
failure event.
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Fig. 4. The stress comparison of pre and post transmission switching for
the 106% loaded IEEE 118 bus test case. The rank and degree in this chart
represent the single highest value for the system.
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Fig. 5. The plot compares the number of lines, violating both emergency
and contingency limits under different loading conditions, including the post
preventive transmission switching.
B. Corrective Transmission Switching
One of the highly critical non-radial contingencies, identi-
fied by PowerWorld Simulator, is 8 Olive - 5 Olive transformer.
For this contingency, the stress on the system is such that at
least one of the in-service lines exceeds the contingency limit,
and therefore, the operator has about 15 minutes to address this
issue or another line will be tripped. The algorithm developed
in this paper suggests switching of 15 FtWayne - 17 Sorenson
line, as a corrective action, to reduce the system stress to an
acceptable level.
Fig. 6 compares the stress on system in terms of critical-
ity rank and degree under different loading conditions for
the base case, contingency (8 Olive - 5 Olive transformer),
and corrective transmission switching of 15 FtWayne - 17
Sorenson line for the IEEE 118-bus test case. The results
confirm the effectiveness of corrective transmission switching
in reducing the post-contingency system stress, close to the
normal operation levels.
V. CONCLUSION
System stress metrics are recently developed to provide
insight into the susceptibility of the system to cascading
failures. The metrics include measures of the criticality of
contingencies and vulnerability of the transmission elements
to overloads after contingencies. Building upon those metrics,
this paper introduced two new metrics to measure the system’s
criticality and vulnerability. All of these metrics can be quickly
calculated via the outputs of the contingency analysis tool,
or through LODFs. Furthermore, the paper investigated the
possibility of employing transmission switching, both as a
preventive and corrective measure, to reduce the system stress.
In order to achieve computational tractability for the trans-
mission switching algorithm, LODF sensitivities were used to
generate a rather small subset of quality switching candidates.
Those candidates were, then, tested for effectiveness, until an
effective solution was found or the list was depleted. The
simulation studies on IEEE 118-bus system confirmed the
effectiveness of the method. A single transmission switching
action was able to substantially reduce the system stress to
the normal levels. This implies that system operators should
look at transmission switching as an effective tool to prevent
cascading failures, when the system is atypically stressed.
Other alternative actions, such as generation redispatch, are
substantially more expensive and may also not be available
when the system is highly stressed.
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Fig. 6. Comparison of system stress in terms of criticality rank and degree under different loading conditions for the base case, contingency case (outage of
8 Olive - 5 Olive Transformer), and post corrective transmission switching of 15 Ft. Wayne - 17 Sorenson.
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